Pentagon Report Outlines Chinese Invasion Options

2022 Annual Report - No Timeline, But Plenty of Red Flags for Taiwan

Dec 04, 2022

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5 December 2022

Pentagon Report Outlines Chinese Invasion Options

2022 Annual Report - No Timeline, But Plenty of Red Flags for Taiwan

By Wendell Minnick (Whiskey Mike) 顏文德

TAIPEI - The annual Pentagon report on Chinese military capabilities is now available. For this posting the Taiwan situation will be highlighted only. If you want to read the full report.

2023 Military And Security Developments Involving The Peoples Republic Of China

4.22MB ∙ PDF file

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First the maps and diagrams:

ABOVE: This map is not much of a surprise, but the follow-on numbers of missiles below are disturbing. For the record, CSS-11 (Dong Feng-16) Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM); CSS-7 SRBM (DF-11); CSS-6 (DF-15); SAM = Surface to Air Missile; CDCM = Coastal Defense Cruise Missile. The 400km range of the CDCM covers all ships in the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan’s naval bases of Kaohsiung (south) and Keelung (north). The CDCM’s turn the Taiwan Strait into a Chinese lake. Further reading on Chinese Anti-Ship and Cruise Missiles.

ABOVE: ICBM = Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (nuclear warhead); IRBM = Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile; MRBM = Medium Range Ballistic Missile; SRBM = Short Range Ballistic Missile; GLCM = Ground Launched Cruise Missile. Note to reader: think of launchers as guns and missiles as bullets. Most of the launchers are road-mobile, making them difficult to locate and destroy (thus the military phrase shoot and scoot). Since the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis, the circular error probability (CEP) or precision strike capability for these missiles has significantly improved, thus making them far more lethal and less likely to cause civilian deaths (thus more tempting to use and reducing redundancy).

ABOVE: It is unclear to me, unless someone can explain it, why Taiwan is listed with 240 Special Mission Aircraft. SMA would include electronic warfare (EW), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and airborne early warning (AEW). For the record, based on my own records, Taiwan’s Air Force and Navy have the following SMA (including helicopters and excluding search and rescue): 12x P-3C Orion ASW; 6x E-2K Hawkeye AEW; 1x C-130HE EW; 11x Beech 1900 EW; x19 S-70 ASW helicopters; 9x 500MD ASW helicopters.

Taiwan’s Army Aviation has nothing in surveillance, unless you want to include the x30 Apache Longbow attack helicopters and roughly x30 OH-58D Kiowa Warriors, both equipped with electronic eyes. Personally, based on my experience on military exercises and talking to military sources, I doubt the C-130HE and the 500MDs are reliable.

I also have little confidence in their Beech 1900s. However, the P-3Cs and E-2K are fully operational. If the DoD is including their x30 fixed wing UAVs in the Taiwan Navy, it still is not enough aircraft to meet the 240 number. Contact me at Chinainarms@substack.com if you know the answer.

Above: Consult China In Arms post Chinese Gunboats and No Diplomacy (Part 1 and Part 2). Further reading on Chinese Submarines and Underwater Warfare Systems.

Below: EASTERN and SOUTHERN THEATER COMMAND; this is the primary force responsible for an invasion of Taiwan. Note the Special Operations units in both maps. The Southern Theater below will also add equipment and manpower, but most likely with their navy and some air power components.