Taiwan: DoD Annual Report on China’s Military
2023 Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China
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20 October 2023 (Friday)
Taiwan: DoD Annual Report on China’s Military
2023 Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China
By Wendell Minnick (Whiskey Mike) 顏文德
TAIPEI - “Report Scope: This report covers security and military developments involving the PRC until the end of 2022.”
I believe, as a 30 year veteran covering military issues as a journalist, that government reports should always be noted for their cost to the taxpayer. The below is more than fair, as much of the report is redundant from older annual reports:
Below are direct quotes from the Report on Taiwan:
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT
● In 2022, the PRC [People’s Republic of China] amplified diplomatic, political, and military pressure against Taiwan. The PLA’s [People’s Liberation Army] increased provocative and destabilizing actions in and around the Taiwan Strait included ballistic missile overflights of Taiwan, sharply increased flights into Taiwan’s self-declared ADIZ [Air Defense Identification Zone] and a series of major military exercises near Taiwan.
● At the 20th Party Congress in 2022, Xi Jinping repeated the CCP’s [Chinese Communist Party] long standing public position that China seeks peaceful unification with Taiwan but would never renounce the use of force as an option.
● The PLA practiced elements of each of its military courses of action against Taiwan during its August 2022 large-scale military exercise aimed at pressuring Taiwan, and again in April 2023 in response to Taiwan president Tsai Ing-wen’s transit of the United States.
[Note to Reader: It is Wendell Minnick’s observation that Ghost Month (Lunar/August-September) and Tomb Sweeping in the Spring are the calmest Sea States in the Taiwan Strait for an amphibious invasion; consequently these exercises are predictable. Therefore, if China does plan an invasion it will occur during these two time periods. It might sound glib on my part, but it does not take a veteran CIA analyst to predict the annual Chinese military exercises or a future timeline of an invasion of Taiwan.]
In 2020, the PLA added a new milestone for modernization in 2027, to accelerate the integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization of the PRC’s armed forces, which, if realized, could give the PLA capabilities to be a more credible military tool for the CCP’s Taiwan unification efforts. During his October 2022 speech at the opening ceremony of the 20th Party Congress, Xi stated that China intends to complete the plan to modernize the PLA by 2027.
Joint Firepower Strike. PLA writings have long emphasized the importance of joint firepower strikes as a component of large-scale operations. Joint firepower strikes include multiple services combining to utilize their firepower capabilities to create substantial effect and have been explicitly tied to a Taiwan invasion in PLA writings. During the August 2022 Congressional Delegation (CODEL) visit to Taiwan, the PLA Rocket Force [People's Liberation Army Rocket Force/PLARF] fired multiple ballistic missiles into impact zones in waters around Taiwan; this included at least four missiles that overflew Taiwan, which was unprecedented. The military drills afforded the PLA an opportunity to train simulated joint firepower strike operations.
[Note to reader: please consider reading Chinese Space Vehicles and Programs and Chinese Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles]
Vice Chairman General He Weidong is China’s second-most senior officer and a former commander of the PLA’s Eastern Theater. His ascent to a vice chairman position absent prior CMC membership is unusual and probably a testament to his extensive operational experience focused on Taiwan. Before his selection as vice chairman, He served a brief stint in the CMC JOCC [Central Military Commission Joint Operations Command Center] where he played a key role in planning live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait as part of the PLA response to the then-U.S. House Speaker Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taipei. He may have close ties to Xi due to their overlapping service in Fujian and Zhejiang provinces in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
[Note to readers from Wendell Minnick: Pelosi’s visit was during Ghost Month, the lunar calendar month that Chinese military exercises are always scheduled due to the fact that the Sea States in the Taiwan Strait are the calmest. It is also my opinion that the missile test over Taiwan during Pelosi’s visit was planned months in advance, long before Pelosi decided to visit Taipei; also the local military bloggers and media did make fun of Pelosi’s visit by issuing this patch:
Back to the Pentagon report:
Readiness. In 2022, the PLAA [People's Liberation Army Army] continued to improve its methods and standards of training combined arms units. Training encompassed individual to collective soldier events integrating reconnaissance, infantry, artillery, armor, engineers, and signal units. In addition to continued PLAA deployments to the LAC [Line of Actual Control] on the Indian border, the PLAA conducted multiple “around the clock” large-scale exercises in training areas throughout the country to include joint operations in response to the U.S. and Taiwan actions in 2022. The PLAA used its new PCH191 [PHL-16] long-range rocket artillery system during live fire events along China’s east coast as a response to the U.S. CODEL in August 2022. The new long-range MRL [Multiple Rocket Launcher] is capable of striking Taiwan from mainland China.
[Note to reader: please consider reading Chinese Rocket Systems: Multiple Launch Rocket Systems and Chinese Tanks and Mobile Artillery]
The largest unplanned event of the year occurred in August 2022, when the PLA conducted live fire drills—including firing ballistic missiles over Taiwan—in response to the CODEL [Congressional Member Delegation] visit to Taipei in August 2022. During the visit, Taiwan’s defense ministry reported that 27 PLA aircraft entered Taiwan’s air defense identification zone, including 22 that crossed the median of the Taiwan Strait. The PLA’s centerline crossings have continued since August as the PLA maintains a heightened readiness level. Such activity reflects ongoing PLA attempts to normalize median line crossings.
In August 2022, the PLA carried out large-scale joint military exercises aimed at pressuring Taiwan. The exercises included firing ballistic missiles over Taiwan’s main island, over a dozen naval patrols, and hundreds of flights into Taiwan’s claimed air defense identification zone (ADIZ).
EASTERN THEATER COMMAND
Key Takeaways
● The Eastern Theater Command is oriented toward Taiwan and the ECS [Extended Continental Shelf].
● The Eastern Theater Command likely would be in charge of a Taiwan Invasion.
● The Eastern Theater Command was responsible for executing the PLA’s large-scale joint exercises aimed at pressuring Taiwan in August 2022.
The Eastern Theater Command has responsibility for the ECS and likely executes operational control over military matters related to Taiwan and Japan, including contingencies in and around the Taiwan Strait and the Senkaku Islands.
During 2022, the Eastern Theater Command maintained focus on a series of training and exercises to improve joint operations and combat readiness, organizing exercises and drills consisting of long-distance training and mobilization, aerial combat, live-fire training, and the use of modified civilian ferries to help augment transportation.
2022 EASTERN THEATER COMMAND LEADERSHIP
Commander of the Eastern Theater Command – General Lin Xiangyang [林向阳]
Previous Position: Commander of the Central Theater Command
DOB: October 1964
Age: 58
Birthplace: Dengjun Village, Haikou Town, Fuqing, Fuzhou, Fujian Province [福建省福州市 福清市海口镇登俊村]
Education: Nanchang Army Academy; Studied abroad in Russia; Attended a class at PRC NDU [National Defense University] for Young- and Middle-aged Cadres [中青班]
Political Commissar of the Eastern Theater Command – General He Ping [何平]
Previous Position; Director of the Political Department of the Western Theater Command; Deputy Political Commissar of the Western Theater Command
DOB: November 1957
Age: 63
Birthplace: Nanchong, Sichuan Province [四川省南充市]
Education: Unknown
Chief of Staff of the Eastern Theater Command, Deputy Commander of the Eastern TheaterCommand – Lieutenant General Hong Jiangqiang [洪江强]
Previous position: Commander of the 80th Group Army, Northern Theater Command Army
DOB: 1965
Age: 57
Birthplace: Meishi Village, Gangwei Town, Longhai, Zhangzhou, Fujian Province [福建省漳 州市龙海市港尾镇梅市村]
Education: Unknown
PLA units located within the Eastern Theater Command include 71st, 72nd, and 73rd Group Armies; the Eastern Theater Navy and its naval aviation division and two marine brigades; and two Air Force divisions, two operational PLAAF [People’s Liberation Army Air Force] bases, and one PLARF [People's Liberation Army Rocket Force] base. During a contingency, the Eastern Theater Command likely also exercises command over some SSF [Strategic Support Force/PLASSF] units in theater and receives strategic intelligence support from the SSF to improve battlefield awareness and facilitate joint operations within the theater.
The Eastern Theater Command also likely commands all CCG [China Coast Guard] and maritime militia ships while they are conducting operations related to the ongoing dispute with Japan over the Senkaku Islands.