Strait Thunder-2025A
Jamestown Analysis
China In Arms BOOKSTORE and GIFT SHOP!
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13 April 2025 (Sunday)
Strait Thunder-2025A
Jamestown Analysis
By Wendell Minnick (Whiskey Mike) 顏文德
TAIPEI - A new paper on the recent Chinese military extravaganza points to a real probability Beijing will attempt an air/sea blockade with landing operations optional.
‘Strait Thunder-2025A’ Drill Implies Future Increase in PLA Pressure on Taiwan’ by Tai-yuan YANG and K. Tristan TANG, Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 25/7 (April 11, 2025).
Yang is Deputy Director at the Research Project on China’s Defense Affairs and a retired colonel of the Taiwan Army and former chief instructor at the Army Command and Staff College, National Defense University.
Tang is a research associate at the Research Project on China’s Defense Affairs and a member of the Pacific Forum’s Young Leaders Program. His research focuses on China’s defense industry, the People’s Liberation Army, and Chinese foreign policy. You can connect with him on X: @KTristanTang.
On April 1, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theater Command announced a joint training drill (联合演训) around Taiwan. The next day, it declared the initiation of the “Strait Thunder-2025A Drill” (海峡雷霆-2025A演练) (Xinhua, April 1, April 2). According to data from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, over the course of these two days, the PLA deployed 135 aircraft, 38 naval vessels, and 12 official vessels in the surrounding area.
A primary focus of the drill in April was on “key area and chokepoint control” (要域要道封控). For example, the Bashi Channel between Taiwan and the Philippines is a chokepoint for entry and exit to the South China Sea (People’s Daily, August 6, 2022). According to Professor Zhang Chi (张弛) of the PRC’s National Defense University, during the drill, the PLA created a strong maritime barrier through chokepoint control with its aircraft carrier strike groups, creating external obstruction and internal pressure or isolation aimed at preventing interference from external forces (Global Times, April 2). Troops were deployed to chokepoints around Taiwan and were also dispersed across more distant maritime and airspace areas, as shown in Figure 4. This included an aircraft carrier group operating farther from Taiwan than during the Joint Sword-2024B period, China Coast Guard (CCG) vessel 2302 operating more than 100 nautical miles east of Taiwan, and three Chinese fishing vessels—suspected to be part of the PRC’s maritime militia—conducting activities 140 nautical miles off the coast of Hualien Harbor in eastern Taiwan in coordination with the CCG (Up Media, April 2; Youth Daily News, April 2). These deployments contrasted with those during Joint Sword-2024B, which concentrated on a blockade of important ports and areas (要港要域封控). This highlights the PLA’s focus on practicing control over Taiwan’s surrounding maritime chokepoints.
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