America's Twisted Policy History on China/Taiwan
Opinion Editorial
America's Twisted Policy History on China/Taiwan
Opinion Editorial
18 January 2025 (Saturday)
TAIPEI - I have asked one source, a former U.S. ex- with 30 years of direct China and Taiwan foreign policy experience, to give my readers a general history lesson on America’s weird policy twists and turns on China and Taiwan from 1979 onwards.
The author’s premise is that the U.S. established diplomatic relations with the PRC owing to Cold War strategy, and although that decision meant de-recognizing the Republic of China (Taiwan), at the height of the Cold War it was an understandable, it was a Realpolitik decision.
The question it is confronting is, notwithstanding the decision to recognize the PRC and derecognize the ROC (Taiwan), in the current environment where China is a threat and Taiwan is important as a democracy and the home to semiconductor manufacturing, what decisions should we make to address our legitimate interest in ensuring Taiwan is not invaded by China?
The source spoke on anonymity for good reason and I do not plan to dwell on the reason, but to simply honor it.
I hope you find his thoughts informative:
Obviously, in a span of 46 years, a hell of a lot changes.
In 1979, China, about which few in government were deluded, nevertheless appeared to be a potentially meaningful quasi-ally in what was shaping up as a Cold War with the USSR getting hotter.
In that sense, the Nixon-Kissinger "opening," the Brzezinski et al efforts on behalf of Carter, and Carter's decision to recognize the People's Republic of China and "de-recognize" the Republic of China (Taiwan) was a classic instance of Realpolitik.
The national security interest of the U.S. was seen by successive administrations, Republican and Democratic, as tied to the defeat of the USSR in the Cold War.
And China did indeed cooperate with the U.S. against the Soviet Union, notably in Afghanistan and Africa.
So China brought concrete assets to that particular table.
Taiwan, whatever the moral, sentimental and philosophical considerations, brought nothing of great consequence.
So Taiwan was treated as an entity whose interests needed to be sacrificed. Some would say it was a pawn on the geopolitical chessboard, while China represented something more like a knight or even a rook.
Even so, U.S. domestic political realities demanded that the historical ties to Taiwan, and the array of emotions and beliefs tied into them, be respected in a publicly observable way such that the US was not seen to be ditching a long-standing ally for the sake of expediency.
From those parameters came the shape of the "deal" with China and the "residual relationship" with Taiwan, including the U.S. insistence that China pledge no military threat or force against Taiwan and the linked U.S. pledge (later, under Reagan, in Aug 1982) to "gradually" reduce the quantity of arms sold to Taiwan and not to "exceed" the quality of arms sold as of 1978.
Congress, obviously, had a considerable role in braking the Nixon-Kissinger intentions and in shaping the post-Carter-recognition shape of U.S. ties with Taiwan.
The bureaucracy fleshed out the picture in light of agreements negotiated with China, a sense of responsibility for Taiwan's security, and the imperatives of domestic politics.
The universe does not stand still. Things change. As the t-shirts put in, in the inelegant form "shit happens" and in the erudite form "entropy happens."
And so ... our side "won" (after a fashion) the Cold War. The Warsaw Pact dissolved.
The USSR imploded. NATO expanded.
Deng sent the PLA into Tiananmen Square to clean out the peaceful protesters.
In the U.S. domestic political arena, there was no longer a geopolitical underpinning for a strategic relationship with China, China had lost the "moral" argument in the eyes of the West, and Taiwan in the meantime had emerged as a nascent democracy and newly thriving economy deserving of respect and support.
By the early 1990s, China was embarked on a program of building its military capabilities commensurate with its growing economic might, but most assessments concluded that the PRC still lacked the ability to mount a successful blockage/invasion of Taiwan.
Meanwhile, precisely because China's economy was expanding and modernizing so rapidly, the new argument for solid US-China ties was promoted mainly by the Fortune 500 and Wall Street investors.
That was a powerful argument in U.S. politics beginning with the first President Bush, deepening under President Clinton, and continuing under the second President Bush and to some extent President Obama.
All the while China was rising rapidly as an economic and military heavyweight, challenging U.S. predominance in East and Southeast Asia ... and aligning ever more clearly with nations the U.S. saw as adversaries, rogues, or worse (North Korea, Iran, Russia in particular though there were others).
Policymakers need to design and adjust policies in keeping with changes in the international and domestic imperatives.
None of this is "easy," and so the issues, which involve lives, philosophy, money and of course military/strategic considerations, are apt to generate a lot of heat in the domestic arena.
All that shapes the environment in which any U.S. administration will rejigger the policies and send requisite signals along with adopting the quiet or public steps deemed necessary to make the desired impression on China, Taiwan, and U.S. allies and friends, especially in the Indo-Pacific area.
By the late 20-teens and Biden administration, Taiwan again came to be seen as having a certain strategic value to the U.S. in the contest with the PRC.
Notably as a potential "platform" for U.S. military forces, and in its semiconductor industry. So those realities dictated new U.S. approaches and adjustments.
Many tomes have been written on all that.
See attached documents in support of the editorial:
